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CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND WALL STREET
EXECUTIVES:
WHY THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK
ACT FALL SHORT
Jennifer G. Chawla*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 2012, a federal jury acquitted Brian Stoker, a former
mid-level manager of Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”), of charges that he
misled investors as part of Citigroup’s complex mortgage securities
1
scheme. This investment scheme was just one of many that large
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Criminology, 2011,
The College of New Jersey. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Kristin
Johnson, and my comments editor, Charles Piasio, for their invaluable guidance and
thoughtful feedback on this Comment.
1
Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, Loss in Citi Case Deals Blow to U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 31,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444860104577561380191553796.h
tml; Peter Lattman, Former Citigroup Manager Cleared in Mortgage Securities Case,
DEALBOOK (July 31, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/formercitigroup-manager-cleared-in-mortgage-securities-case; Grant McCool, SEC Loses Civil
Fraud Case Against Ex-Citigroup Manager, REUTERS (July 31, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/citigroup-stoker-verdictidUSL2E8IVFOE20120731. The allegation against Brian Stoker was that, as lead
structurer of Citigroup’s synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO), known as
Class V Funding III, he defrauded investors by failing to disclose that Citigroup not
only had a role in selecting the collateral for the CDO, but also was simultaneously
betting against the same CDO. See Complaint at 19, SEC v. Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d
605 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-CV-7388). CDOs are bank-created securities, formed by
bundling various debt-instruments together and then selling shares of that bundle to
investors. Neal Deckant, Criticisms of Collateralized Debt Obligations in the Wake of the
Goldman Sachs Scandal, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407, 411–12 (2010). During the
housing boom, CDOs became a popular way for banks to make a profit. See id. at
418–21. Soon afterwards, banks started creating synthetic CDOs by combining credit
default swaps. See id. at 425–26. Credit default swaps are investments that function as
a type of insurance on other securities; specifically, a party holding a debt obligation
“swaps” the risk of investing in that obligation by paying another party a fee in
exchange for a guarantee that the other party would pay the debt in the event of a
default. Id. at 415. As a result, an investor buying a synthetic CDO was essentially
betting that a bond held by someone else would not pay off. See id. The gravamen of
the SEC’s complaint was that Citigroup was creating CDOs and selling them to
investors without disclosing that they were also betting that those same CDOs would
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banks perpetuated in the years leading up to the recent financial
crisis, and this case was just another of the federal government’s
unsuccessful attempts to hold an individual banking executive
2
accountable. But there was something unique about this trial—its
jury. In an unexpected move, the Stoker jury delivered a special
3
message to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Penned
on a scrap of yellow paper torn from a legal pad, a note enclosed
within the verdict envelope read, “[t]his verdict should not deter the
4
S.E.C. from continuing to investigate the financial industry[.]”
It is unusual for a jury to supplement its verdict with a statement,
but this jury felt an explanation was necessary. Although the SEC did
not make a compelling case against this executive, the jury wanted it
to be clear that the federal government must continue to pursue
5
actions against the individuals responsible for the financial crisis.
The problem in Stoker, according to jury foreman Beau Brendler, was
that the SEC targeted a relatively low-level manager, one whose
behavior was not only tolerated, but possibly encouraged, by his
6
bosses. Mr. Stoker did not act in a vacuum. His actions were merely
a glimpse into a much broader culture on Wall Street, one pervaded
7
with greed and irresponsibility. The jury believed that the SEC was
fail. See Complaint, Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605 (No. 11-CV-7388). CDOs are
considered to be a “root cause” of the 2008 financial crisis. Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets
Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, DEALBOOK (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that
-ruled-against-it.
2
See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14
/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version titled, In
Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures).
3
The SEC is a federal agency created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006) (“Exchange Act”). The Exchange Act provides the SEC with
disciplinary powers bring civil enforcement actions against those that violate the
federal securities laws. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 20,
2014, 8:56 AM), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter How the
SEC Protects Investors].
4
Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2010) (analyzing the culture of financial firms in the years
preceding the financial crisis and discussing how risk taking that begins as a
calculated, rational action can become emotionally compromised, and consequently
irrational, as a result of unnaturally prolonged periods of prosperity, increased
competitive pressures, and unrealistic market demands).
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making Mr. Stoker into a scapegoat for more generalized grievances
8
toward the financial industry. For this reason, Mr. Brendler does not
regret the verdict. But he does have one lingering thought: “I wanted
9
to know why the bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial[.]”
In this regard, Mr. Brendler is not alone—his remarks are
representative of a general public sentiment. In the aftermath of the
recent financial crisis, many are wondering why there have been no
10
successful prosecutions of high-ranking bank executives. Although
the SEC filed a handful of civil cases against managers of financial
11
12
institutions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not filed a single
8

Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1.
Susan Beck, Stoker Jury Foreman Explains How Verdict Didn’t Absolve Citi,
COUNSEL
(Aug.
3,
2012),
CORPORATE
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202565823107/Stoker-Jury-Foreman-ExplainsHow-Verdict-Didn’t-Absolve-Citi; Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That
Ruled Against It, supra note 1; Brian Stoker Jury Wants Wall Street CEOs Put on Trial,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/08/06/brian-stoker-jury_n_1747218.html.
10
See, e.g., Peter J. Boyer & Peter Schweizer, Why Can’t Obama Bring Wall Street to
Justice?; Maybe the Banks Are Too Big to Jail. Or Maybe Washington’s Revolving Door Is at
Work., NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2012, at 26, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com
/newsweek/2012/05/06/why-can-t-obama-bring-wall-street-to-justice.html;
Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis Prosecutions?
Ex-Justice Official Says It’s Just Too Hard, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.propublica.org/article/why-no-financial-crisis-prosecutions-official-saysits-just-too-hard; see also 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS television broadcast
Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www. cbsnews.com/8334-504803_162-5741806210391709/full-coverage-60-minutes-on-the-financial-crisis/?pageNum= 2&tag=next;
Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables.
11
Brian Stoker’s case was the first of these CDO-related cases to go to trial.
McCool, supra note 1. At the time of Stoker’s acquittal, former bank managers
Fabrice Tourre of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”) and Edward
Steffelin of GSC Capital Corp. were awaiting trial on similar charges. Id. The SEC
ultimately dropped the case against Steffelin. Bob Van Voris & Greg Farrell, SEC
Drops Case Against Manager Who Packaged ‘Squared’ CDO, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-16/sec-drops-case-against-manager-whopackaged-squared-cdo.html. But the case against Tourre was successful. In August
2013, a jury found Mr. Tourre liable on “six counts of civil securities fraud after a
three-week jury trial” in which the SEC accused Mr. Tourre of “misleading a small
group of investors about the role of a big client in a 2007 trade he helped structure.
That client, the hedge fund Paulson & Company, made about $1 billion on the trade
while [the other investors] lost big.” Susanne Craig, Fabrice Tourre Seeks a New Trial,
DEALBOOK (Oct. 1, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/fabricetourre-seeks-a-new-trial/?_r=0.
12
While the SEC has authority to bring civil actions in response to violations of
federal securities laws, How the SEC Protects Investors, supra note 3, the DOJ has
authority to file criminal charges. About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:14
AM), http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html.
9
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criminal charge against any senior banking executive of a large
financial institution since its first attempt at prosecuting two
managers of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (“Bear Stearns”)
13
resulted in acquittals in 2009.
This Comment evaluates whether recently enacted criminal
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
14
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) can facilitate the imposition of
criminal liability on financial executives and allow for more effective
prosecutorial efforts.
Part II of this Comment discusses the
underlying causes of the 2008 financial crisis as well as the potentially
criminal actions by banking executives that contributed to the burst
of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. This Part
then examines the aftermath of the financial crisis—specifically, the
apparent decision of the DOJ not to pursue criminal actions against
large financial institutions and their chief executive officers. Finally,
Part II describes the legislative response to the financial crisis—the
15
16
Dodd-Frank Act —which, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act before it,
creates new federal crimes that the DOJ could use to prosecute
individuals in the financial industry who use misleading and
deceptive tactics for their own financial gain. Part III explains the
potential impact of criminal sanctions on corporate executives and
articulates the importance of effectively imposing criminal liability on
these individuals, as it can obtain deterrence objectives that civil
liability cannot. Part IV then examines specific criminal provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act and concludes that they will not be effective in
imposing criminal liability on corporate executives; despite their
appearances, these provisions do not substantively give the DOJ a new
way to prosecute individual financial crimes, nor do they address the
13

Ben Hallman, Too Big to Jail: Wall Street Executives Unlikely to Face Criminal
POST
(Sept.
8,
2012),
Charges,
Source
Says,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/08/criminal-charges-wallstreet_n_1857926.html?view=screen; Peter J. Henning, Is That It for Financial Crisis
Cases?, DEALBOOK (Aug. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2012/08/13/isthat-it-for-financial-crisis-cases.
14
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C,
12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
15
Id. at 1376 (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).
16
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (“An
Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”).
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issues that the DOJ seems to be having in bringing such criminal
actions. This Part then suggests how the government could improve
the Dodd-Frank Act to better achieve deterrence objectives and allow
the DOJ to more effectively prosecute individuals in the financial
industry. Part V concludes.
II. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. The Causes of the Financial Crisis: Action and Inaction of Financial
Executives
Since late 2007, the United States has suffered through its worst
17
economic downturn since the Great Depression. Economic growth
18
19
is slow, unemployment rates are high, and the housing market
20
remains fragile. In May 2009, Congress passed, and the President
21
signed, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.
This Act
established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“the
Commission”), an independent panel of ten private citizens tasked
with “examin[ing] the causes, domestic and global, of the current
22
financial and economic crisis in the United States.” In January 2011,
after reviewing thousands of documents, interviewing over seven
hundred witnesses, and holding nineteen public hearings in New
York, Washington, D.C., and other communities affected by the
financial crisis, the Commission published a comprehensive report
23
detailing its findings.
17

Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3,
2012,
at
A15,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.h
tml; Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
1,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.
18
Annie Lowrey, Last Quarter’s Growth Is Revised Down Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/economy/last-quartersgrowth-is-revised-down-sharply.html.
19
Phil Izzo, Good News! The Unemployment Rate Rose, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2012,
8:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/11/02/good-news-the
-unemployment-rate-rose.
20
Kasia Klimasinska & Betty Liu, Housing-Market Recovery in U.S. Not ‘Resounding,’
Shiller Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201211-06/housing-market-recovery-in-u-dot-s-dot-not-resounding-shiller-says.
21
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123
Stat. 1617 (“An Act [t]o improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities and
commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds . . . for the recovery
of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.”).
22
Id. at § 5, 123 Stat. at 1625.
23
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 978-0-16-087983-8, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
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First, the Commission concluded that the 2008 financial crisis
24
was avoidable—“the result of human action and inaction.”
Although many individuals on Wall Street claimed that this crisis
could not be foreseen or averted, the Commission found that
warning signs, or “red flags,” were both abundant and largely
25
ignored. In the years leading up to the crisis, financial institutions
were creating, buying, and selling mortgage securities that they knew,
26
or at least should have known, were defective.
The spike in
27
subprime mortgage lending and subsequent securitization led to an
unsustainable rise in housing prices and, correspondingly, a
substantial increase in individual household debt; simultaneously, a
vast expansion of the unregulated derivatives trading market served
28
to exacerbate the problem. Despite signs that these activities were
posing a significant threat to the financial stability of the country,
Wall Street institutions not only failed to take any mitigating actions,
29
but continued to be active players in these risky markets.
The Commission also found that another significant
contributing factor to the crisis was the failure among financial
institutions in the areas of corporate governance and risk

REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi–xii (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
24
Id. at xvii.
25
Id. at xvii–xviii.
26
Id. at xx.
27
Subprime mortgage lending refers to the practice of issuing “low-quality”
mortgages, or mortgages issued to borrowers who lack “a quality credit history.”
Deckant, supra note 1, at 422. The subsequent securitization of these mortgages
refers to their being “bundled together” and sold to investors as CDOs. Id.
Unsurprisingly, in early 2007, many of these subprime mortgages began to default,
causing the “bubble” of inflated home prices to collapse. Id.
28
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xx.
29
Id. For example, in 2007, just as the crisis was beginning to come to light,
Citigroup was criticized for being a major provider of loans used in leveraged
buyouts. See Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, DEALBOOK (July 7, 2007),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-stilldancing; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Safest Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A23,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/opinion/nocera-the-safestavailable
at
bank.html. Although initially lucrative, excessive lending of this kind was particularly
risky because, in the case of a credit downturn, the bank would be unable to support
the loans. Id. Former Citigroup Chief Executive Officer Charles Price, however,
defended his bank’s participation in this market by saying, “[a]s long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance[.]” Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’,
supra.
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30

management. Prior to 2007, the prevailing view was that regulating
31
financial institutions would restrain innovation. Without sufficient
regulation, however, banks engaged in extremely reckless behavior,
“taking on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much
32
dependence on short-term funding.”
In addition, executive
compensation systems worked to further incentivize excessive risktaking by rewarding executives for taking short-term risks, often by
leveraging excessive shareholder funds, without sufficient regard for
33
the long-term consequences.
Another study recently found further support for the notion that
inadequate regulatory oversight may foster a criminogenic
34
environment.
A survey of five hundred “financial services
professionals” across the United States and the United Kingdom
revealed that twenty-four percent of respondent professionals
believed, in order to be successful, they would need to engage in
unethical or illegal conduct; twenty-six percent claimed they had
firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing in the workplace; and sixteen
percent said they would commit a crime if they knew they could get

30

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xviii–xix.
Id.
32
Id. at xviii.
33
Id. at xviii–xix. Specifically, some scholars argue that executive compensation
packages focus solely on short-term profits, which enable executives to receive large
cash amounts, equity-based compensation, and bonus compensation before the longterm consequences of their actions are realized. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010). These executives
therefore have an incentive to focus on short-term results, without giving sufficient
weight to the consequences that risk-taking may have on shareholder value in the
long-term. Id. Further, these scholars argue that some executive compensation
packages are “tied to highly levered bets on the value of the banks’ assets” and the
structure of these compensation packages gives executives even less incentive to
account for the “losses that risk-taking could impose on preferred shareholders,
bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.” Id. Not all scholars, however, agree that
executive risk-taking was a driving factor in the financial crisis. See Andrea Beltratti &
Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A CrossCountry Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
15180,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf (arguing that banks with “more loans and
more liquid assets” performed better than banks with “stronger capital supervision”
during the financial crisis).
34
Financial Services Professionals Feel Unethical Behavior May Be a Necessary Evil and
Have Knowledge of Workplace Misconduct, According to Labaton Sucharow Survey, LABATON
SUCHAROW
(Feb.
20,
2014,
9:47
AM),
http://www.labaton.com/en
/about/press/Labaton-Sucharow-announces-results-of-financial-services-professional
-survey.cfm.
31
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35

away with it. Furthermore, thirty-nine percent of respondents said
they believed their competitors are likely to have engaged in illegal or
unethical activity in order to be successful; thirty percent stated that
their compensation or bonus plans create pressure to compromise
ethical standards or violate the law; and twenty-three percent
reported other pressures that may lead to unethical or illegal
36
conduct.
Finally, the Commission concluded that “there was a systemic
37
breakdown in accountability and ethics.”
Mortgage fraud, for
example, flourished during 2006–2007 as a result of low lending
38
Financial institutions were
standards and lenient regulation.
39
making loans that they knew borrowers would not be able to afford.
These banks then packaged the loans and sold them to investors,
even though they knew that these loans did not “meet their own
40
underwriting standards or those of the originators.”
Banks
accomplished this scheme by disingenuously sampling the packages
of loans that they were selling so that this information would remain
41
undisclosed to potential investors.
Eventually, the borrowers of the underlying mortgages began to
default—the housing market bubble burst and owners of the
42
mortgage-backed securities lost their investments. Many of these
35

Id.
Id.
37
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xxii.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. For example, Richard Bowen, who served as senior vice president and
chief underwriter for correspondent and acquisitions for Citigroup’s commercial
lending group from 2002 to 2005, described in a recent interview how loans that
were being considered for purchase from Citigroup would consistently be missing
critical documents that would have been necessary to determine whether they met
the bank’s credit policy guidelines (e.g., income documentation necessary to verify a
loan applicant’s income to debt ratio). In sum, Mr. Bowen found that sixty percent
of loans purchased either did not meet the bank’s standards or were missing too
much information for the underwriters to make an adequate evaluation of their
creditworthiness. Nevertheless, the decisions of the underwriters to turn down the
purchase of such loans were reversed by “someone high up the chain of command,
the chief risk officer of the Wall Street channel.” This resulted in an increase in the
“execution percentage” of these pools and a subsequent purchase of them by
Citigroup. Azmat Khan, Blowing the Whistle on the Mortgage Bubble, PBS (Jan. 22, 2013
9:44PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/untouchables/blowing-the-whistle-on-the-mortgage-bubble.
42
Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regulation,
17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 279, 290–91 (2011).
36
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investors, however, had purchased CDOs to insure against these
44
losses. As a result, the magnitude of the impact that these defaults
would ultimately have on the economy was not fully realized until it
was revealed that many CDO issuers were not adequately capitalized
to make good on their promises to compensate protected investors
45
from losses.
This resulted in a domino effect of defaults and
insolvency, shaking the foundation of many Wall Street firms and
46
crippling the United States economy.
B. The Department of Justice’s Response: No Criminal Prosecutions
Since the publication of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Phil
Angelides, who served as chairman of the Commission, has
repeatedly called upon the DOJ to pursue criminal investigations
47
against Wall Street executives.
In these appeals, Chairman
Angelides stressed the importance of focusing on criminal, rather
48
than civil, wrongdoing because the latter fails to deter future crimes,
something which is especially true in light of the fact that “[c]laims of
financial fraud against companies like Citigroup and Bank of
America have been settled for pennies on the dollar, with no
49
admission of wrongdoing.” Chairman Angelides has further urged
the federal government to devote more resources toward pursuing
these investigations, stating that, as the situation stands, justice has
50
not been served. But despite the findings of the Commission and
against the advisement of its chairman, the DOJ has failed to
43

Collaterized debt obligations. See discussion supra note 1.
Sharma, supra note 42, at 290.
45
See id. at 290–91.
46
See id.
47
Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2012, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/will-wallstreet-ever-face-justice.html?_r=0; Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Renew Urgency on Wall Street
(Sept.
4,
2012),
Probe,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80606.html.
48
Angelides, Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, supra note 47 (“Deterring future
crimes can’t be accomplished simply through fines or negotiated financial
settlements—which many banks regard as the cost of doing business. Senior
executives need to know that if they violate the law, there will be real
consequences.”).
49
Angelides, Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, supra note 47.
50
Id. (“No one should seek or condone prosecutions for revenge or political
purposes. But laws need to be enforced to deter future malfeasance. Just as
important, the American people need to believe that a thorough investigation has
been conducted; that our judicial system has been fair to all, regardless of wealth and
power; and that wrongs have been righted.”).
44
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prosecute any top executive of a Wall Street institution in the years
51
since the crisis. Furthermore, as time passes, it becomes increasingly
52
unlikely that any such prosecution will materialize.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the prospect of an
aggressive response from federal law enforcement seemed promising.
On June 19, 2008, the DOJ announced that the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York had indicted
Ralph Cioffi and Mathew Tannin, two senior managers of Bear
53
Stearns, on counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud.
The indictments alleged that Cioffi and Tannin “marketed the two
funds as a low risk strategy, backed by a pool of debt securities such as
mortgages” and, even though they “believed the funds were in grave
condition and at risk of collapse,” they “made misrepresentations to
54
stave off investor withdrawal.”
As the first major prosecution stemming from the financial crisis,
many followed this case closely, as they believed it would set the scene
55
for how future cases would unfold.
The prosecution, however,
56
proved futile—a jury acquitted the managers in November 2009.
The government’s case, which relied primarily on statements made
51

Boyer & Schweizer, supra note 10; Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Peter
Schweizer, Obama’s DOJ and Wall Street: Too Big For Jail?, FORBES (May 7, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/07/obamas-doj-and-wall-street-too
-big-for-jail.
52
Generally, the statute of limitations for securities fraud and other federal
offenses is five years from the commission of the alleged wrongdoing for civil actions,
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (2006), and ten years from the commission of the alleged
wrongdoing for a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(3) (2006). Time, therefore, is
running out, especially for actions that occurred during the “bubble years” (i.e., the
years prior to 2007 when excessive subprime mortgage lending and securitization
caused the unsustainable spike in housing prices). No Crime, No Punishment,
Editorial,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
26,
2012,
at
SR10,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-nopunishment.html; see Hallman, supra note 13; Henning, supra note 13; Wang, supra
note 10.
53
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for
Roles in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part of Operation “Malicious Mortgage” (June
19, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-odag-551.html.
54
Id.
55
Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125788421912541971.html; Ex-Bear Stearns
Hedge
Fund
Managers
Acquitted,
REUTERS
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/bearstearns-managersidUSN1032890420091110; Zachery Kouwe, Bear Stearns Managers Acquitted of Fraud
Charges, DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/10
/2-ex-fund-managers-found-not-guilty-of-fraud.
56
Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55; Kouwe, supra note 55.
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57

by the executives via email, demonstrated the difficulty of proving
58
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in modern financial fraud cases.
Not only do these cases involve complex investment instruments that
59
the government had little information on prior to the crisis, but,
within the framework of this unprecedented market failure, the
distinction between executives’ intentionally misleading statements
and their “positive spin[s] on sagging returns” that just ultimately
60
proved to be incorrect seems blurred.
Particularly in the Bear
Stearns case, despite the government’s best attempts to present Cioffi
and Tannin’s actions as a straightforward case of lying, the jury did
not believe that the statements, once put into context, were sufficient
61
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After the trial, one juror
explained: “The entire market crashed . . . . You can’t blame that on
62
two people.”
Despite this setback, the federal government remained
committed to its prosecutorial efforts. That same month, President
Obama appointed United States Attorney General Eric Holder as
chairman of the newly created Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
63
Force. At the time, Attorney General Holder stated that mission of
the Task Force was to “hold accountable those who helped bring
about the last financial meltdown” and “to prevent another meltdown
64
from happening.” He further declared that “[w]e will be relentless
in our investigation of corporate and financial wrongdoing, and will
57

The prosecution used email exchanges between Cioffi and Tannin in an
attempt to prove that the two managers were personally aware of the true financial
condition of the funds and lied to investors in order to keep them from withdrawing.
Landon Thomas Jr., 2 Face Fraud Charges in Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20
/business/20bear.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version titled, Prosecutors Build
Bear Stearns Case on E-Mails). Excerpted portions of the emails include statements
such as: “[The subprime market looks] pretty damn ugly”; “[W]e should close the
funds now . . . . The entire subprime market [is] toast”; “I’m fearful of these
markets”; and “Believe it or not—I’ve been able to convince people to add more
money.” Id.
58
Kouwe, supra note 55.
59
Morgenson & Story, supra note 2.
60
Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55.
61
Bear Stearns Trial: How the Scapegoats Escaped, DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/bear-stearns-trial-how-the-scapegoats
-escaped.
62
Id.
63
Schweizer, supra note 51.
64
Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big To Jail, FORBES (July 29,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/29/why-doj-deemedbank-execs-too-big-to-jail.
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not hesitate to bring charges, where appropriate, for criminal
65
misconduct on the part of businesses and business executives.”
But in the years since the formation of this task force, the DOJ
still has not filed a single criminal charge against any major banking
66
executive. It dropped its most recent attempt at such a pursuit, an
67
68
investigation into Goldman Sachs’s “Abacus” deal, in August 2012.
Furthermore, this lack of prosecutions seems to be indicative of a
more general trend. Financial fraud prosecutions, as a whole, are
down thirty-nine percent since the accounting scandals of the early
69
2000s —a time when the DOJ was much more aggressive in
prosecuting not only financial fraud generally, but also high-level
70
executives individually, for this type of fraud.
For example, in October 2001, regulators discovered that Enron
Corporation (“Enron”) had been misrepresenting its earnings and
65

Id.
Id.; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE 4 (2012), available at
http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf
[hereinafter
JUSTICE INACTION].
67
In 2007, Goldman Sachs created a risky investment called Abacus 2007-AC1 at
the request of a prominent client. Goldman Sachs then allowed the client to choose
bonds to shape the investment instrument. Although Goldman Sachs and the client
bet against the Abacus instrument, Goldman Sachs did not disclose this information
or information about how the bonds were selected to its other clients who had
invested in its success. These uninformed clients lost more than a billion dollars on
the deal. As a result, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with securities fraud,
specifically for making materially misleading statements or omissions; the SEC
simultaneously referred the case to the DOJ for criminal investigation. Boyer &
Schweizer, supra note 10.
68
The case with the SEC eventually settled, with Goldman Sachs maintaining no
wrongdoing. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay
Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO
(July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. In
the settlement papers, Goldman Sachs merely acknowledged that “the marketing
materials for the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction contained incomplete information”
and that “Goldman regrets that the marketing materials did not contain [the]
disclosure.” Id. Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement,
noted that “[h]alf a billion dollars is the largest penalty ever assessed against a
financial services firm in the history of the SEC” and “[t]his settlement is a stark
lesson to Wall Street firms that no product is too complex, and no investor too
sophisticated, to avoid a heavy price if a firm violates the fundamental principles of
honest treatment and fair dealing.” Id. But, as some commentators have noted, for
Goldman Sachs, this penalty is “a relative pittance.” Boyer & Schweizer, supra note
10. In fact, “[t]he fine amounted to about 4 percent of the sum that Goldman paid
its executives in bonuses ($12.1 billion) in 2007, the year of the Abacus transaction.”
Id.
69
JUSTICE INACTION, supra note 66, at 6.
70
Id.
66
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altering its balance sheets in order to make the company seem more
71
profitable than it actually was. Eventually, this behavior prompted
72
Enron to declare bankruptcy. Shortly afterward, the DOJ charged
Enron Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey
Skilling with securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy; both
73
executives were found guilty on all counts.
The DOJ obtained
similar guilty verdicts in criminal actions against Worldcom, Inc.
74
(“Worldcom”) CEO Bernard Ebbers, Tyco International Ltd.
(“Tyco”) CEO Dennis Koslowski, and Tyco Chief Financial Officer
75
(CFO) Mark Swartz.
Various theories exist to explain why the DOJ is not more
actively pursuing cases of financial fraud since the recent financial
crisis. Some commentators suggest the lack of regulation that
perpetuated the crisis has, in its aftermath, made it difficult to
subsequently pursue those same behaviors that more adequate
76
regulation could have prevented.
This is because, in the past,
regulators who were specifically trained to understand and dissect
complex financial matters were able to identify fraudulent practices
early and, when necessary, refer cases to the DOJ for criminal
prosecution. The data collected by these regulators was crucial to the
77
DOJ’s efforts to build criminal cases.
No such information is
available, however, for cases alleging fraud in connection with
complex derivative securities, which were unregulated before the
78
crisis.
71

Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV.
163, 262 n.35 (2003).
72
Id. at 262, n.1
73
Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide ‘Red Meat’ To Prosecutors
Chasing Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114860468837563784.html.
74
Bernard Ebbers was charged with, and found guilty of, securities fraud,
conspiracy, and making false filings with securities regulators. He was alleged to have
been using dishonest accounting practices to inflate Worldcom’s stock price. Id.
75
Dennis Koslowski and Mark Swartz were charged with, and found guilty of,
conspiracy, grand larceny, securities fraud, and falsifying business records after they
were discovered stealing millions of dollars from Tyco. Walter Hamilton & Thomas
S. Mulligan, Ex-Chiefs Convicted of Looting Tyco, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/18/business/fi-tyco18.
76
Morgenson & Story, supra note 2.
77
Id.
78
Id. (“[I]n 1995, bank regulators referred 1,837 cases to the Justice
Department. In 2006, that number had fallen to 75. In the four subsequent years, a
period encompassing the worst of the crisis, an average of only 72 a year have been
referred for criminal prosecution.”).
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Another possibility is that the element of mens rea, or intent,
that prosecutors must prove in a criminal case imposes too high a
burden. The DOJ proffered this explanation when it announced its
79
decision not to prosecute Goldman Sachs. It was also a reason why
80
the DOJ was not successful in the Bear Stearns trial. To prove fraud
in federal cases, the prosecution must show that the defendant
81
intended to make material misstatements or omissions, and this
82
intent must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This can be
difficult in cases involving complex securities sold to sophisticated
investors because investment banks tend to include voluminous,
generic disclosure statements that they can later use to claim a lack of
83
intent to deceive. Moreover, in the context of the recent financial
crisis and its “unprecedented market turmoil,” the question of
whether financial executives were intentionally misleading their
investors or merely “putting a positive spin” on the banks’ market
84
performance is unclear. Thus, banks can argue that “while certain
statements by executives ultimately proved incorrect . . . they believed
85
what they were saying.”
Notwithstanding the merits of these theories, the sentiment
among government officials, prosecutors, and commentators seems
to support the notion that, although the individual conduct that led
to the financial crisis was undoubtedly reprehensible, criminal
86
accountability is not realistically attainable under current law.
79

Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth Rappaport, U.S. Not Seeking Goldman Charges,
ST.
J.
(Aug.
9,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article
WALL
/SB10000872396390443537404577579840698144490.html; David Ingram, Justice
Department Will Not Prosecute Goldman Sachs, Employees for Abacus Deal, REUTERS (Aug. 9,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/us-usa-goldman-no-chargesidUSBRE8781LA20120809; Phil Mattingly, U.S. Won’t Prosecute Goldman Sachs,
Employees Over CDO Deals, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2012-08-09/justice-finds-no-viable-basis-for-charges-against-goldman.html.
80
Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55.
81
18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
82
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged[.]”) (emphasis added); see
also David Ingram & Aruna Viswanatha, Goldman Sachs Will Not Face Criminal Charges:
Justice
Department,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
9,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09/goldman-sachs-justicedepartment_n_1762455.html; No Crime, No Punishment, supra note 52.
83
Henning, supra note 13.
84
Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55.
85
Id.
86
See JUSTICE INACTION, supra note 66, at 16 (quoting Attorney General Eric
Holder: “[W]e found that much of the conduct that led to the financial crisis was
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C. The Congressional Response: The Dodd-Frank Act
Legislators responded to the financial crisis by enacting the
87
Dodd-Frank Act. The stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to
88
improve “accountability and transparency in the financial system.”
As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act’s primary function is to introduce
various new reforms for regulating the financial industry, but it also
creates some new federal crimes related to fraud and
misrepresentations made by individuals engaging in derivatives
89
These provisions, largely
trading, futures contracts, and swaps.
found in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, serve primarily to expand
90
upon existing laws, such as the Commodity Exchange Act, in order
to include previously unregulated derivatives and security swap
91
transactions.
Specifically, there are two sections in the Dodd-Frank Act that
address the use of deceptive devices, materially misleading statements
or omissions, and fraud in financial transactions: Sections 741 and
747. Section 741 provides that it shall be a crime for a person to, in
connection with making a future contract or swap of securities,
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; “make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading”;
or “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
92
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” Section
747 states that it shall be a crime for a person who, while entering
93
into a securities swap transaction, knows or acts in reckless disregard
unethical and irresponsible . . . we have also discovered that some of this behavior—
while morally reprehensible—may not necessarily be criminal”); Peter Lattman, U.S.
Goldman Disclosure a Rare Break in Secrecy, DEALBOOK (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/justice-department-closes-investigationof-goldman (“[B]ased on the law and evidence as they exist at this time, there is not a
viable basis to bring a criminal prosecution against Goldman Sachs.”); see also
Mattingly, supra note 79 (quoting Senator Carl Levin: “Whether the decision by the
Department of Justice is the product of weak laws or weak enforcement, Goldman
Sachs’ actions were deceptive and immoral.”).
87
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
91
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
92
Id. at § 741, 124 Stat. at 1731.
93
One example of a securities swap transaction is a credit default swap. In a
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of the fact that “its counterparty will use the swap as part of a device,
94
scheme, or artifice to defraud any third party.”
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several other provisions that
95
purport to be enforceable by criminal sanctions. The scope of this
Comment, however, is limited to evaluating whether the criminal
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act can facilitate the imposition of
criminal liability on financial executives for fraud and
96
misrepresentation. Therefore, the analysis that follows will focus
solely on those aforementioned provisions in Title VII, as they
specifically relate to the making of false or misleading statements or
omissions.
III. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
A. The Need for Personal Liability for Corporate Crimes
The imposition of personal liability on corporate executives
97
serves important deterrence objectives.
The threat of personal
liability for misconduct can dissuade managers and directors from
98
It can also
abusing their positions of power for personal gain.
encourage these managers and directors to utilize their oversight
authority to prevent other executives from engaging in self-serving
99
misconduct.
Furthermore, in the absence of personal liability, punishment
would be levied against the corporation itself. A corporation,
credit default swap, the investor of the security pays a premium to a counterparty
(e.g., a third party which, by virtue of a contract, becomes vulnerable to financial
risk). In exchange, the counterparty agrees to pay the investor a specified sum upon
the occurrence of a “credit event.” An example of a triggering credit event would be
a default in payments on the underlying asset. This exchange functions as a type of
insurance against credit risk for the investor. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial
Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 160 (2009).
94
Dodd-Frank Act § 747, 124 Stat. at 1675–76.
95
See, e.g., id. at § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675–76 (making it a crime for any person to
enter into a swap transaction without first submitting the swap for clearing to a
registered derivatives clearing organization); id. at § 746, 124 Stat. at 1737
(addressing insider trading); id. at § 747, 124 Stat. at 1739 (making it a crime for one
engaged in trading to “violat[e] bids or offers”; “demonstrate[e] intentional or
reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions”; be involved in “spoofing
(bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)”).
96
See infra Part IV.A.
97
See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2010).
98
Id.
99
Id.
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100

however, is a fictional entity.
When it acts, it is acting through its
101
Therefore, it is not the behavior of the corporation as an
agents.
entity that needs to be punished and deterred, but rather the
102
behavior of its agents (i.e., its managers and directors).
Sanctions
against the corporation, which usually take the form of fines, do not
serve this deterrence goal because they “harm innocent parties such
as shareholders, consumers, and creditors, rather than guilty
103
corporate agents.”
B. Civil Actions Do Not Effectively Impose Personal Liability on
Corporate Executives
Not everyone believes that personal liability via the criminal
justice system is an appropriate mechanism for dealing with
104
corporate misconduct.
High-profile criminal prosecutions of
corporate officers can result in lengthy terms of incarceration for
105
Accordingly, some
individuals with no prior criminal history.
scholars argue that private actions in the civil realm, which impose
106
monetary penalties, provide a more suitable solution. The problem
with such an approach, however, is that it fails to address whether the
civil system is actually effective in responding to this kind of
107
misbehavior.
Under traditional notions of corporate law, directors and
108
officers of corporations are largely insulated from personal liability.
First, plaintiffs often face significant procedural and substantive
109
hurdles in the context of shareholder derivative suits, which are
suits brought on behalf of the corporation against executives alleged
100

Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation
and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 77, 85 (2006).
101
Id.
102
Id. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386
(1981)).
103
Id. at 86.
104
Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 364
(2008).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 380.
108
Lisa M. Fairfax, On the Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation As an Alternative to
Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 117, 118 (2011); Martin Petrin,
Circumscribing The “Prosecutor’s Ticket To Tag the Elite”—A Critique of the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 303 (2012).
109
Fairfax, supra note 108.
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110

to have breached their fiduciary duties. Procedurally, shareholders
are limited in the claims they can bring as a result of the demand
111
requirement, which allows a corporation’s Board of Directors to
112
terminate a derivative suit before it reaches trial.
Substantively, if
the demand requirement does not bar the claims, executives are still
113
protected by the deferential business judgment rule. Second, even
in cases where the business judgment rule is inapplicable, because
either the director is found to have acted in bad faith or the action is
one brought by a third party, statutory and contract provisions may
114
work to exculpate the director from personal liability.
Finally,
assuming that an executive is found liable and the situation is such
110

Officers and directors of corporations, while acting in their capacity as
managers, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). These duties include the duty of care, the
duty of loyalty, and the duty to act in good faith. If a director breaches any one of
these duties, a shareholder of the corporation may bring a derivative action on
behalf of the corporation to enforce the duty. John A. Pearce II & Ilya A. Lipin, The
Duties of Directors and Officers Within the Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 361, 370 (2011).
111
Every jurisdiction requires a shareholder to “make a demand” (i.e., seek
redress for his or her grievances) on the corporation’s Board of Directors before the
shareholder can bring a derivative suit against those directors. Carol B. Swanson,
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball,
77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 (1993). Generally, a shareholder is only excused
from making a demand if he or she can demonstrate that making the demand would
be futile. Id. The purpose of this requirement is to give the corporation’s board a
chance to address the shareholder’s complaints without litigation. Id. If the
managers believe that the shareholder’s claims have merit, they may choose to take
corrective actions. Id. If the managers do not agree with the claims, however, they
may refuse to take action and even seek early dismissal of a derivative suit related to
such claims. Id.
112
Fairfax, supra note 108.
113
Id. The business judgment rule is a doctrine of corporate law that works to
protect directors and officers from being held liable for breaching their fiduciary
duty of care if the basis for the alleged breach can be framed as a “business decision.”
The business judgment rule is broad and protects against most claims brought
against these individuals by shareholders on behalf of the corporation, unless it can
be shown that the decision was based on “intentional or bad faith misconduct.”
Petrin, supra note 108, at 303–04.
114
Fairfax, supra note 108. All states provide an indemnification statute within
their corporate laws. Petrin, supra note 108, at 317. These statutes proscribe
mandatory and permissive instances where employees of a corporation would be
indemnified from liability. Id. In addition, many corporate officers and directors
will have even broader indemnification rights as a result of the corporation’s charter
or by-laws. Id. It is very common for public corporations to agree to indemnify their
managers and directors “to the fullest extent permitted by law.” These
indemnification agreements generally cover an executive’s litigation expenses and
attorneys’ fees in addition to any amounts incurred as judgments, fines, or
settlements. Casey, supra note 97, at 21–22.

CHAWLA(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

5/12/2014 1:58 PM

COMMENT

955

that the corporation does not indemnify his or her actions, the
corporation may still provide director and officer insurance that
would most likely cover all payments that are owed by the
115
defendant.
In addition to the obstacles imposed by law, civil suits also suffer
from practical hindrances. Private lawsuits do not provide an
116
effective response to instances of “low-level fraud.” This is because,
for the average shareholder, it is often not economically feasible to
take on the cost of litigation against the managers and directors of a
corporation, especially if the alleged misconduct did not cause
117
substantial diminution in the value of their shares. Joining together
and filing a collective action can also be difficult, especially in light of
the aforementioned procedural and substantive hurdles associated
118
with these suits.
SEC enforcement actions against individual
executives are similarly sparse, and even when the agency does decide
119
to bring a case, the penalties are often not significant. Therefore,
while directors who engage in misconduct face a theoretical financial
risk, this risk does not, in practice, constitute a truly deterrent
120
threat.
Because civil liability is not well-equipped to deter individual
executives from engaging in wrongful acts, it does not provide an
121
adequate remedy for corporate misconduct.
Since the risk of
detection and liability is small, managers who stand to gain from
unlawful activity will view the possibility of being sanctioned as a mere
122
cost of doing business. In the same way that under-enforcement of
petty street crimes can lead to “urban decay,” which in turn leads to
the commission of more serious crimes, one scholar has paralleled
115

Casey, supra note 97, at 36; Petrin, supra note 108, at 320–21 (“Corporations
may purchase insurance to protect their directors, officers, employees, or agents
against personal liability arising out of ‘wrongful acts’ for which they are not
indemnified. For instance, virtually all public companies purchase directors and
officers (‘D&O’) insurance. Insurance can provide for broader protection than
indemnification, as corporate law does not place any limitations on the permissible
scope of D&O coverage.”); see also Fairfax, supra note 108 (“[P]rocedural and
substantive rules, together with the trinity of D&O insurance, indemnification
provisions, and exculpatory statutes, have combined to make outside directors’ risk
of personal liability under corporate law virtually non-existent.”).
116
Hurt, supra note 104, at 372.
117
Id. at 381.
118
Id.
119
Fairfax, supra note 108, at 121.
120
Id.
121
Casey, supra note 97, at 85.
122
Id.
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the under-enforcement of “small-scale corporate fraud” as similarly
leading to “an environment of renegade entrepreneurs who are not
able to properly assess the probabilities of penalties for certain
123
behaviors.”
C. Criminal Law Provides a Solution
When applied in the corporate context, criminal law can
effectively deter executive misconduct because it is not inhibited by
124
the protections that executives enjoy in the civil realm.
Criminal
actions brought by the government are not subject to the same
procedural and substantive hurdles, such as the demand requirement
and the business judgment rule, that typically bar private shareholder
125
actions.
In addition, exculpatory charter provisions cannot
exculpate a manager or director from personal criminal liability, and
there are no statutory indemnifications for violation of criminal
126
laws.
As a result, these officers can be held accountable under
criminal law for certain behaviors which, under traditional notions of
127
corporate law, would not result in personal liability.
When laws are under-enforced, their ability to deter violations is
minimal, regardless of the potential sanction. It is the certainty of
punishment, not its severity, which can more effectively dissuade an
128
individual from violating the law.
Because corporate law
protections do not apply to criminal actions, the government has
procedural and substantive advantages in bringing criminal cases that
allow it to attain higher conviction rates and, therefore, greater
129
deterrent effects.
123

Hurt, supra note 104, at 373.
See Petrin, supra note 108, at 304.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id; see Casey, supra note 97, at 1.
128
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 778 (2010) (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178 (1968)) (“[T]he
certainty of legal penalties are more important than their severity.”); see also Hurt,
supra note 104, at 373. An example of this principle, in a more prosaic situation, is a
car driving on a road where violation of the speed limit results in a $100 fine. If
police rarely patrol the road, drivers would most likely not be deterred from violating
the speed limit. Even if the fine is raised to $200, as long as the road remains
unpatrolled, violations are likely to continue at comparable rates. But, if instead of
increasing the fine, the police begin patrolling more frequently, drivers will be
encouraged to slow down. The increased certainty of detection will have more of a
deterrent effect than the increase in severity of a potential sanction.
129
See Casey, supra note 97, at 44.
124
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From a procedural standpoint, prosecutors have significant
130
discretion in charging decisions.
Substantively, they have a wide
range of crimes within the federal criminal code from which to
131
choose these charges.
Grand juries also do not pose much of a
hurdle in criminal prosecutions because they frequently cooperate
132
In addition,
with prosecutors and return requested indictments.
pleading standards are more favorable for prosecutors than they are
for private plaintiffs. “Unlike shareholder plaintiffs, who must plead
fraud with height-ened [sic] particularity in both state and federal
court, prosecutors need only provide a plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
133
charged.”
As a result, it is very uncommon for criminal actions to
134
be dismissed on a motion by the defendant at the pleading stage.
Criminal law is also capable of deterring wrongdoing because of
its unique sociological impact. At least one scholar has argued that
the aspect of “shaming” implicit in criminal sanctions can have an
“effective influence” on the individual and, correspondingly,
corporate behavior, especially when applied to “top-level corporate
135
executives.” These executives are all part of a common community
136
Exposing
that is comprised of very “status-conscious” individuals.
this population to criminal prosecution, which carries with it the
potential for incarceration, can have damaging effects on their
reputations, even when the exposure comes only in the form of a
137
threat. Studies have found that both the anticipation, as well as the
experience, of this type of “shame” can substantially deter corporate
138
139
crime on both the general and specific level.
130

Id.
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 45 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1)) (quotations omitted).
134
Id.
135
Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 959, 966 (1999).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 970–71.
138
BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS 12, 283–314 (1983) (finding that the negative impact of adverse publicity
on offenders and their employees may be more effective than the threat of formal
sanctions in controlling corporate crime); Barnard, supra note 135, at 970–71 (citing
Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing
a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 549, 572 (1996)) (stating
that individuals’ feelings of guilt and shame, and the threat of informal sanctions are
“significant deterrents” to corporate crime); Lori A. Elis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal
Sanction Threats and Corporate Crime: Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. CRIME &
131
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The increased certainty of personal liability combined with the
stigma associated with criminal prosecutions provides criminal law
with a unique and effective way of targeting corporate misconduct.
Civil suits rarely hold private individuals accountable in the corporate
140
context. The barriers to personal liability, however, do not apply to
141
violations of criminal law. Criminal prosecutions can also result in
extra-monetary sanctions and implications, which enhance their
142
ability to deter wrongdoing.
The possibility that a corporate
executive may be put in jail, or even placed at a personal financial
risk, will affect his or her decision-making differently than will the
possibility of a fine that will ultimately be paid by the corporation.
Executives are unlikely to consider individual criminal liability to be a
“cost of doing business”; therefore, the imposition of such liability
could have strong deterrent implications not otherwise achievable
143
through civil law.

DELINQ. 399, 410 (1995) (concluding that subjects’ perceptions that friends, family
and business associates will lose respect for them if they participate in corporate
crime significantly decrease the likelihood that they will do so); Harold G. Grasmick
& Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the
Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990) (concluding that like state-imposed
sanctions, self-imposed shame and socially-imposed embarrassment can also deter
future criminal activity); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring
Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 467, 485
(1993) (stating that anticipation of shame is negatively related to likelihood of
committing certain crimes).
139
Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 138. Specific deterrence refers to the ability of
a sanction to deter the specific individual punished from committing additional
crimes. General deterrence refers to the ability of a sanction to deter others who
have not yet offended from ever committing crime. See Paternoster, supra note 128,
at 766. In this context, specific deterrence would apply to the corporate executive
subject to criminal prosecution while general deterrence would apply to those in the
“broader business community.” Barnard, supra note 135, at 971.
140
See discussion supra Part III.B.
141
Petrin, supra note 108, at 304.
142
Barnard, supra note 135, at 971 (“[E]ffective deterrence (at least of
individuals) can also come from non-economic sources. Shaming is one such
source.”).
143
Angelides, Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, supra note 47 (“Deterring future
crimes can’t be accomplished simply through fines or negotiated financial
settlements—which many banks regard as the cost of doing business. Senior
executives need to know that if they violate the law, there will be real
consequences.”).
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IV. IMPOSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AFTER
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. An Evaluation of the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Although the Dodd-Frank Act adds new crimes to the already
expansive federal crime repertoire, it does not substantively give the
DOJ a new way to criminally target the dishonest conduct that was an
144
underlying cause of the recent financial crisis.
In addition, the
fraud provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act do not address the issues that
have prevented the DOJ from bringing criminal indictments against
145
the executives of financial institutions. As a result, it is unlikely that
prosecutors will be able to use these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
to more successfully impose criminal liability on Wall Street
executives.
First, the Section 741 fraud provisions of Title VII appear to
146
duplicate what is already criminalized by the mail fraud and wire
147
148
fraud statutes of the United States Code. The mail and wire fraud
149
statutes are incredibly broad. Wire fraud, which is more applicable
today as information is usually transmitted electronically rather than
by mail, imposes criminal liability on anyone who:
. . . having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both. If the violation . . . affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
150
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Section 741, by contrast, imposes criminal liability for fraud only
when it relates to entering a futures contract or to making a swap on
144

See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the causes of the recent financial crisis.
See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the DOJ’s reasons for not pursuing
financial fraud charges against financial executives.
146
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
147
Id. at § 1343.
148
Juliane Balliro, Criminal Provisions and Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, FOR
THE
DEFENSE
50,
53
(July
2011),
http://www.nelsonmullins.com
/DocumentDepot/Balliro_DRI.pdf.
149
Id.
150
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added).
145
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151

a securities transaction.
These types of transactions, however, are
necessarily covered by the language of the wire fraud statute. Futures
contracts and securities transactions are made for the purpose of
152
“obtaining money or property.”
In addition, the jurisdictional
requirement that a representation be “transmitted by means of
153
wire . . . in interstate or foreign commerce” is not difficult to meet
today, since electronic communication exists in almost every industry.
As a result, Section 741 does not criminalize any new behavior apart
from what can already be prosecuted as wire fraud.
Section 741, moreover, imposes less harsh criminal penalties
than the wire fraud statute does. A defendant who is convicted under
154
Section 741 faces a potential prison term of up to ten years. Under
the wire fraud statute, however, the same defendant faces a penalty of
155
up to thirty years. While an increase in severity of punishment does
156
not necessarily lend itself to more effective deterrence, this point
emphasizes that Section 741 does not provide any new mechanism
for prosecuting financial fraud.
Furthermore, Section 741 neither alters the criminal intent
requirement for federal securities fraud cases, nor affects the burden
of proof that prosecutors must meet to obtain a criminal
157
conviction.
But this requirement of showing that defendants,
beyond a reasonable doubt, intended to deceive their investors is
158
exactly what the DOJ struggled to prove in the Bear Stearns trial.
Additionally, the DOJ expressly acknowledged that its inability to
fulfill this requirement was an instrumental factor in its decision to
159
drop its criminal investigation against Goldman Sachs.
Since
Section 741 does not address the underlying issues that the DOJ has
with respect to these criminal prosecutions, it is unlikely that Section
741 will alter the status quo by providing a more effective way for the
151

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 741, 124 Stat. 1376, 1731 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 1343.
153
Id.
154
7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5) (2006); see also Balliro, supra note 148.
155
18 U.S.C. § 1343.
156
See supra Part III.C for a discussion on how the certainty and severity of
punishment impact deterrence.
157
Prosecutors must prove each element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable
doubt before a conviction can be obtained against a criminal defendant. This
standard is a constitutional right guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the Due
Process Clause. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
158
See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
159
See Albergotti & Rappaport, supra note 79; Ingram, supra note 79; Mattingly,
supra note 79.
152
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government to criminally investigate and indict corporate banking
executives.
Section 747, by contrast, facially addresses the issue of proving
mens rea, as it allows for liability to be imposed when one acts with
reckless disregard that counterparties to his or her swap transaction will
160
use the swap to defraud.
But although Section 747 allows a less
161
culpable state of mind on the part of defendants, it does not
address the fact that, for liability to be imposed, the primary
offenders (i.e., the ones committing the fraud) still must have intent
to deceive. This is because, in order to show that defendants were
criminally reckless, meaning they consciously disregarded a
162
substantial and unjustifiable risk, with regard to whether the
counterparties would commit fraud, there must be some evidence
163
that the counterparties did, in fact, intend to commit fraud. Even
with the lower mens rea standard for secondary offenders, the DOJ
will likely struggle in bringing these cases; the evidentiary difficulties
that hinder investigations against primary offenders will similarly
persist during investigations against secondary offenders. As a result,
it is unlikely that Section 747 will be effective in increasing individual
criminal accountability.
B. A Comparison with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The scarcity and inadequacy of the criminal provisions in the
Dodd-Frank Act stand in stark contrast to the criminal penalties in
164
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The two statutes are similar in that they
were both passed in an effort to curb dishonesty and to increase
165
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
accountability in the financial world.
160

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010).
Criminal recklessness is a less culpable state of mind than both criminal intent
and criminal knowledge. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(14), 2.02(2)(c) (2012)
(defining recklessly), with MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(13), 2.02(2)(b) (2012)
(defining knowingly).
162
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
163
If there were no evidence that the counterparties (i.e., the primary offenders)
intended to commit fraud, then under Section 747, defendants (i.e., the secondary
offenders) could not be shown to have consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the counterparties would, in fact, commit fraud.
164
Compare Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376, with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
165
Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376 (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.”); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 745 (“An Act [t]o protect investors by
161
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however, contains a myriad of certification provisions that are
166
For example, the Sarbanesenforceable by criminal penalties.
Oxley Act explicitly provides that a CEO or CFO can go to prison for
“falsely certifying corporate financial reports and reports on internal
167
controls[.]”
These provisions were a direct response to the
168
Enron/WorldCom/Tyco accounting scandals in the same way that
169
the Dodd-Frank Act was a response to the recent financial crisis.
In the years since Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, few,
if any, individual criminal prosecutions have been brought as a result
170
of it. Some critics cite this as a failure of the Act to hold financial
171
What such criticism fails to recognize,
executives accountable.
however, is that even without being utilized as a prosecutorial tool,
Sarbanes-Oxley has had a resounding effect on the behavior of
172
corporate executives.
After Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many
corporations began to require multiple layers of sub-certification,
which mandate that numerous lower-level officials “attest to the
accuracy of financial reports” before such reports reach the CEO or
173
CFO.
The threat of personal and criminal liability for false or
materially misleading financial reports leads many CEOs to refuse to
174
sign a report unless it is certified by a lower-level executive. In fact,
one survey of corporate leaders found that, on average, between
twenty-two and twenty-three executives submit a sub-certification for a
175
report before it is signed by the CEO or CFO.
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes.”).
166
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745.
167
Alison Frankel, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Lost Promise, REUTERS (July 27, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-financial-sarboxidUSBRE86Q1BY20120727.
168
Kathleen A. Lacey, Barbara Crutchfield George & Clyde Stoltenberg, Assessing
the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Certification Provisions: A Comparative
Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 401–03
(2005).
169
See supra Part II.C.
170
Frankel, supra note 167; Wang, supra note 10.
171
Daniel V. Dooley, Sr. & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment Deter Financial
Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 620–21 (2010).
172
Frankel, supra note 167.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. DelVecchio, Revisiting the Ripple Effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 C.P.A. J. 32 (May 2006), available at http://www.nysscpa.org
/printversions/cpaj/2006/506/p32.htm.
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The practical effect of this change is that corporations had to
become more vigilant in their financial reporting procedures at all
176
levels.
In this way, increased personal accountability for false or
materially misleading financial statements deters fraudulent
reporting, and as a result, “there have been few accounting scandals
177
at major public corporations since Sarbanes-Oxley took effect.”
Further, the fact that Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
during a time when the federal government was comparatively much
178
more aggressive in prosecuting financial fraud likely amplifies its
effectiveness with regard to deterrence. The criminal convictions of
financial CEOs such as Enron’s Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling send
a message to the corporate world that the government will not
tolerate this type of ethical misconduct. Combined with SarbanesOxley’s creation of new targeted federal crimes, the perceived
probability of an individual financial executive being held criminally
liable for false or misleading financial statements is greatly increased.
This consequence, in turn, allows for a much greater deterrent effect.
C. A Proposal to More Effectively Impose Criminal Liability
In the way that legislators specifically drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to hold individual financial executives accountable for the
conduct underlying the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, this
Comment proposes that the Dodd-Frank Act would be a more
valuable tool in deterring and prosecuting the conduct underlying
the recent financial crisis if it contained more substantive criminal
provisions that directly target financial executives.
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act could include provisions
similar to the certification provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
imposing requirements on high-ranking corporate officials that are
enforceable through criminal penalties. This could entail requiring
high-level executives, such as CEOs and/or CFOs, to submit quarterly
statements certifying that they have reviewed both the internal riskmanagement controls of the institution and the investor disclosures
and have independently determined that both are adequate and nonmisleading.
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act could impose disclosure
requirements on any senior-level executive who decides to override
176

Frankel, supra note 167.
Id.
178
See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Enron/Worldcom/Tyco prosecutions.
177
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an underwriter’s decision to not purchase and securitize a particular
bundle of loans because the loans in the bundle do not meet the
institution’s underwriting standards. Namely, the executive could be
mandated to issue a statement outlining the reasons behind the
decision and why he or she believes that the risks associated with the
investment should be overlooked. This requirement would impose a
greater degree of individual accountability on senior-level executives
for excessive risk-taking and encourage more ex ante consideration of
consequences.
In addition, creating more targeted crimes would allow the DOJ
to bring more narrowly tailored cases against individuals, which may
help the DOJ in proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The DOJ cited an inability to prove mens rea as the key issue that
forestalled its prosecution of the Bear Stearns managers for fraud in
179
2009.
The government tried to frame the case as one of
straightforward lying, but the jury did not believe the situation to be
180
The ability to utilize a statute that more directly
so simple.
addresses the type of behavior at issue—making misleading, and even
false, statements to investors regarding the risks of their
investments—would increase the government’s chances of
convincing a jury of criminal intent.
This is because the criminality of the conduct would no longer
be at issue. When the DOJ charged the Bear Stearns managers with
fraud, it had to prove to the jury not only that the managers
intentionally misled investors, but also that the act of misleading
investors was an instance of criminal fraud, rather than a “permissible
181
spin” of the facts. If, however, statutory support had been available
for the government to assert that misleading investors is a criminal
act, then the government would only have needed to prove the first
issue to the jury: that the individuals intended their statements to be
misleading. The confusion that exists as to whether or not this type
of misrepresentation should be criminally punished would dissipate.
Furthermore, this alternative would be more desirable than
lowering the mens rea standard for criminal fraud to recklessness or
gross negligence, as doing so could have potentially catastrophic
consequences on the financial industry. Risk-taking is an inherent
part of participation in financial markets, and criminal laws should
not be aimed at constraining opportunistic behavior. Rather, it is
179
180
181

Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55; Kouwe, supra note 55.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
Thomas, supra note 57.
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only when one crosses the line and employs deceptive techniques to
gain a tactical advantage within the market or to make excessive
profits at the expense of others that the criminal law must intervene.
Finally, this is not to say that the Dodd-Frank Act, as currently
enacted, holds no potential to facilitate the prosecution of financial
fraud. The recent financial crisis was different from those of the past
in that the allegedly fraudulent behavior took place on a secondary
derivatives market which, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, was virtually
182
unregulated.
In past crises, the government brought successful
criminal actions against individuals in part because regulators had
183
The lack of
the ability to refer such claims to prosecutors.
regulation, therefore, not only made the perpetration of fraud more
feasible in the years leading up to the crisis, but also made fraud
184
more difficult to pursue in the aftermath. By increasing regulation
in the world of derivative transactions and other swaps of complex
securities, the Dodd-Frank Act will better equip the government to
build criminal cases in the future, should the need arise.
V. CONCLUSION
In the years since the 2008 financial crisis, public criticism over
the lack of criminal prosecutions against individual financial
executives persists. There remains a lingering sense of injustice over
the fact that those individuals largely responsible for the economic
collapse have not been held accountable for their actions. Though
this retributivist function of criminal punishment is not insignificant,
this Comment argues that it is the utilitarian function of criminal
liability—the goal of attaining deterrent effects—which must be
emphasized going forward.
The imposition of criminal liability can deter financial
executives and, correspondingly, financial institutions from
defrauding their investors in a way that civil enforcement actions
cannot. But to achieve this deterrence, wrongdoers must perceive
criminal prosecution for such financial fraud to be likely. As long as
the DOJ continues to have difficulty in bringing criminal charges in
this area, the full potential of criminal law to deter corporate
executive misconduct will not be realized.
As currently enacted, the criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank

182
183
184

See Morgenson & Story, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
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Act will not effectively enable the DOJ in criminally prosecuting
financial executives for their roles in bringing about the recent
financial crisis because the provisions do not address the issues that
have hindered these prosecutions in the past. This Comment
therefore proposes alternative criminal provisions that would be
better suited to address these impediments. By adopting these
measures, the government could more successfully hold the
individuals responsible for the financial crisis accountable and deter
others from engaging in similarly self-serving misconduct. Moreover,
even if not heavily utilized, the presence of strong, targeted criminal
penalties in the Act could still serve a valuable deterrent function and
prevent a similar crisis from arising again.

